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Abstract - Contributions to Brancaccio and Fontana (2011) look at a variety of aspects of the 
current crisis, some of them focusing on the contingent financial causes, others on the 
underlying contradictions of capitalist economies. In this context, less attention has been paid to 
the role of Europe and particularly Germany. Europe has not been distinguished by an assertive 
and cooperative economic policy stance in the aftermath of the current crisis. German 
mercantilist policies are said to be behind the European policy stance and a source of regional 
and global imbalances. After a brief examination of the main pillars of European economic 
policy and German behaviour during the present crisis, these notes suggest an embryonic 
interpretation of the origins of mercantilist behaviour, dwelling on the nature of mercantilism in 
economic theory and commercial practice, and of the allegedly German mercantilist model. The 
suggested interpretation is that in the German case, the national mystique of a trade surplus may 
have had a role in disciplining the labour market and at the same time assuring profits. Recent 
developments in Spring 2010 have shown the gravity of the European imbalances in the global 
crisis (see Cesaratto 2010) and the relevance of the background issues discussed in the present 
paper. 
 
Jel Classification: B11, N14, F1, F33 
 
 
Sergio Cesaratto, Dipartimento di Economia politica, Università degli Studi di Siena 
e-mail: cesaratto@unisi.it 




Contributions to Brancaccio and Fontana (2011) look at a variety of aspects of the current crisis, 
some of them focusing on the contingent financial causes, others on the underlying contradictions 
of capitalist economies.
2 Some contributors touch on the international dimension of the crisis, the 
so-called global imbalances. In this context, less attention has perhaps been paid to the role of 
Europe and particularly Germany. Europe has not been distinguished by an assertive and 
cooperative economic policy stance in the aftermath of the current crisis, to the point that pundits 
have looked at the so-called G2 as the most authoritative global body. German mercantilist policies 
are said to be behind the European policy stance and a source of regional and global imbalances.
3 
After a brief examination of the main pillars of European economic policy and German behaviour 
during the present crisis (sections 1 and 2), these notes suggest an embryonic interpretation of the 
origins of mercantilist behaviour, dwelling on the nature of mercantilism in economic theory and 
commercial practice (section 3), and of the allegedly German mercantilist model (section 4). The 
thesis I suggest is that in the German case, the national mystique of a trade surplus may have had a 
role in disciplining the labour market and at the same time assuring profits. Mercantilism can also 
be a natural course once it is recognised that absolute and not necessarily relative advantages may 
determine participation in international trade. Further developments in Spring 2010 have shown the 
centrality of the European imbalances in the global crisis (see Cesaratto 2010) and the relevance of 
the background issues discussed in the present paper. 
 
1. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC POLICY 
European economic policy has deliberately not built on the idea of macroeconomic policy 
cooperation. This is seen as unnecessary since growth and employment are regarded as problems to 
be dealt with at national level. The European Monetary Union (EMU) is based on three pillars: 
unified monetary policy, absence of assertive fiscal policy and flexibility of national labour 
markets. Let us examine them. 
 
The theoretical reference framework for monetary policy is well known: the latter has no real 
effects in the long run, and if effective, may be harmful in the short term; it is therefore better to 
leave it in the hands of an independent central bank whose sole objective is price stability. This 
stance marks a significant difference with respect to the Fed that also considers adequate growth 
and employment as targets. The Treaty of Lisbon that came into force on 1 December 2009 ratifies 
the independence of the Central Bank and price stability as its primary target, as if these were   2 20/05/2010 
general principles like, say, civil rights, and not disputable academic and political stances about 
which European citizens should have a say. This framework is plainly wrong: monetary policy is 
effective in the short and long run. Expansionary monetary (and fiscal) policies sustain growth and 
employment. Inflation is not the automatic result of monetary policy per se, but of the distribution 
conflict that becomes fiercer when economies approach full employment. The mandate of the ECB 
is not to accommodate distribution conflict, and it accomplishes that role by threatening or adopting 
a restrictive monetary stance. An ‘independent’ central bank is therefore a watchdog of labour 
market discipline. 
 
European fiscal policy is only expressed in negative terms: the well-known ‘constraints’ inscribed 
in the Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997). As a result of repeated violations of 
these treaties by the main European powers, namely Germany and France, and as a repercussion of 
the crisis, these constraints have been relaxed or abolished, although they remain a reference point. 
The theoretical inspiration of this stance is to be found in the conventional thesis that profligate 
countries could profit from the EMU due to lower interest rates that do not include devaluation risk. 
This would imply crowding-out of prudent countries’ savings. By contrast, from a non-conventional 
point of view, it can be argued that frugal countries’ exports benefit from careless countries’ 
profligacy, and that the resulting trade surplus finances that profligacy.  
 
The framework provided by the first two pillars is thus quite remote from the idea of coordinated 
European macroeconomic policy. The EU indeed has a European board concerned with economic 
policy, Ecofin, the council of EU ministers of finance, and after Ecofin meetings, the ministers in 
EMU meet the governor of the ECB, in the so called Eurogroup (cf. Panico and Vazquez Suarez 
2008).
4 However, this is not a formal decision-making authority since the Germans have always 
rejected the idea of an official, political counterpart to the ECB.
  
 
Finally, it is a firm tenet of EU economic philosophy that employment is a national target that must 
be pursued at national level through labour market reforms. The neoclassical idea that lower wages 
lead to full employment is behind this. The European strategy has been called ‘competitive 
deflation’ and is clearly a zero-sum strategy. It is a policy of competitive devaluation under false 
pretences that cannot be collectively successful; it may perhaps favour single countries, but to the 
detriment of the others. 
   3 20/05/2010 
The conclusion is that in the absence of a fully coordinated macroeconomic framework, it comes as 
no surprise that the EU does not play an assertive role in the determination of global 
macroeconomic policies, let alone support a coordinated policy. The question is then why the main 
European power, Germany, traditionally opposes this kind of policy at regional and global level. 
 
2. GERMANY AND THE CURRENT CRISIS 
There is little doubt that Germany is a great export machine. Since the early 1950s her trade and 
current balances have been in surplus, with few exceptions, and export, import and surplus ratios on 
the GDP have steadily risen. In the last decade, the ratio of imports of goods and services increased 
from 33 per cent in 2000 to 41 per cent in 2008, that of exports from 33 per cent in 2000 to 47 per 
cent in 2008, the surplus from slightly positive in 2000 to 6% per cent in 2008. By way of 
comparison, the corresponding percentages for France in 2008 were 28, 26 and -2, and for Italy 29, 
28 and -1 (source: Eurostat). Data for trade in goods is more impressive (Germany being in deficit 
for trade in services). The trade surplus on the GDP rose from 2.8 per cent in 2000 to 7 per cent in 
2008 with export on GDP being 28 per cent in 2000 and 39 per cent in 2008. The corresponding 
percentages for France in 2008 were -3.5 and 20, and for Italy 0 and 23. In absolute terms, German 
exports were €983B in 2008 against 971B of China, and the respective trade surpluses were 177B 
and 202B (194B and 191B in 2007). Notoriously, intra-EU trade is the main component of German 
total trade. In 2008 German exports in the EU27 were 24 per cent of German GDP, imports 20 per 
cent, the corresponding percentages for France being 13 and 16, and for Italy 13 and 12. This is 
important for two reasons: first, the European macroeconomic context is particularly relevant for 
German external performance; secondly, the German economy is increasingly integrated with 
peripheral countries, Eastern Europe but also Italy. In this respect Germany has been defined as an 
industrial hub (De Cecco, La Repubblica 19 January 2009) or, more negatively, as a bazaar 
economy (Sinn 2006). The remarkable share of foreign trade on the German GDP is therefore not 
only explained by the export orientation of the economy, but also by decentralisation of less 
complex phases of the production cycle. 
 
In the course of the present crisis, German exports of course suffered the fall in global demand; 
however Germany reacted in line with her traditional economic stance, which is non cooperative at 
global and European level, relying basically on export-led recovery and adopting the measures 
necessary to preserve her productive capacity and skilled labour force. 
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In early summer 2008, when the gravity of the impending crisis was already visible, the ECB 
disgracefully raised the interest rate to intimidate Ig-Metall. The crisis naturally took charge of 
trimming down Ig-Metall’s claims, showing the futility of that move. In fall 2008, German policy 
makers began accusing the Americans of causing the financial crisis, which in their opinion 
justified German inaction in the hope of export-led recovery led by those allegedly responsible: ‘We 
can only hope that the measures taken by other countries ... will help our export economy’, stated 
Michael Glos, then German minister for the economy (Financial Times 30 November 2008). The 
German banks were indeed involved in financial excesses to the tune of $1,500B of toxic assets. As 
De Cecco ironically explains: Germany had no house bubble at home, house prices have been 
depressed in Germany for years, so they looked for one in the US (La Repubblica 22 June 2009), as 
a way to allocate the external financial surplus.  
In autumn 2008, at the outbreak of the financial crisis, French President Sarkozy repeatedly argued 
that the ECB had to be flanked by an official authority (Eurogroup) concerned with fiscal policy 
(headed by himself to give it authority). The Germans declined, fearing that the independence of the 
ECB would suffer (a political committee would have higher status than ECB technocrats). This was 
not the first time Germans said no to France in this regard. So when Eurogroup national leaders last 
met in October 2008 to co-ordinate a response to the chaos unfolding on the financial markets, 
Sarkozy, who chaired the meeting, proposed continuing the practice, but was rebuffed by Germany. 
 
The G20 meeting in May 2009 was preceded by German refusal of any American-sponsored global 
macro policy coordination, and indeed nothing happened in this direction. Later in June, Angela 
Merkel reproached the ECB for indirectly sustaining the mounting European public deficit by 
injecting abundant and cheap liquidity that banks then used to buy government bonds. Later that 
summer, Germany reinforced her conservative-mercantilist stance by introducing a balanced-budget 
clause in the German Constitution; moreover a sentence of the German Constitutional Court ruled 
any hypothetical European federal economic governance to be unconstitutional, reaffirming the 
nature of the EU as a club of independent states.  
 
In January 2010, the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero, inaugurating the Spanish EU 
Council Presidency, apparently supported by Herman Van Rompuy, the new European President, 
and by José Manuel Barroso, chairman of the European Commission, maintained that the French 
idea of holding meetings of the Eurogroup at the level of heads of state and government was ‘still 
alive’. He sustained a ‘qualitative leap’ in common economic governance of the EU, arguing that a 
new ‘dialogue’ should be inaugurated between the ECB and the ‘European Council’ of national   5 20/05/2010 
government leaders. However, we are informed that few days later the Spanish foreign minister and 
the EU puppet President played down the proposals, after prompt censure by Rainer Brüderle, the 
German minister for the economy, who described them as ‘not very useful’. A few weeks later, the 
Greek case of public debt on the verge of default erupted.
5 Germany initially opted, albeit 
reluctantly, for direct bail-out of Greece to avoid any idea of concerted fiscal help from Euroland. 
However, German public opinion firmly opposed bailout of the ‘profligate’ southern partner, having 
accepted the domestic rigour of the German economic stance over the previous decades. Once again 
the French authorities seized the opportunity to ask for co-ordination of European economic policy. 
As a result, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel vaguely conceded something in that direction, 
but once again only at EU and not EMU level, to avoid any idea of limiting ECB independence (to 
be reinforced by the appointment of Axel Weber, the orthodox Bundesbank President, as next 
director). Further developments regarding the Greek and, by now, the European crisis, are 
illustrated in Cesaratto (2010). 
 
3. THE GHOST OF MERCANTILISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
3.1. Mercantilism as a disharmonic view of international economic relations 
Germany seems a good example of a mercantilist economy: focus on trade surplus, production and 
productivity; wage moderation and compression of internal consumption; concern about a 
competitive real foreign exchange rate. 
 
Mercantilism is a somewhat mysterious phase in the history of economic analysis. The existence of 
a consistent school of thought thus defined has been defended by some and denied by other 
historians of the discipline. A broad definition of mercantilism inspired by the German historical 
school, and subscribed by Eli Heckscher (1955: I-21) in his classical treatise, refers to the set of 
economic and trade policies pursued by nation states in order to establish their political power. A 
narrower classical definition of mercantile policies identifies them with pursuit of a trade surplus.  
 
As well known, Adam Smith ferociously attacked the mercantilist doctrine. In theory, he asserted 
the advantages of international trade for all participating nations through exchange of surplus 
products, market expansion and thereby extension of the division of labour (1776: 446-7). In 
practice, he accused the mercantile doctrine of looking after the interests of merchants and 
producers, while sacrificing those of consumers (ibid.: 661-2). Note that Smith held a theory of 
absolute advantages from trade which is very different from the theory of comparative advantages 
attributed to David Ricardo.
6 A theory of absolute advantages is in principle consistent with the   6 20/05/2010 
pursuit of mercantilist policies, e.g. trade policies aimed at developing and safeguarding national 
absolute advantages. In other words, despite his attack on mercantilism, his theory of international 
trade is not inconsistent with a disharmonic view of international political relations. On the other 
hand, the theory of comparative advantages and neoclassical theorems of international trade support 
a harmonic view of international political relations, one in which international laissez-faire brings 
benefits to all participants. Both theories are, however, open to criticism.
7 According to the 
disharmonic view, unequal economic power of nations may lead late-comers to limit free trade; and, 
in the case of more balanced industrial powers, full exploitation of the mutual advantages of free 
trade may require deliberate macroeconomic cooperation among the main economies. In both cases, 
there are limitations to laissez-faire policies. It is not by chance that Keynes, who did not believe in 
the harmonic virtues of laissez-faire, wrote sympathetically on mercantilism in the General Theory. 
It can be appreciated that mercantilism does not reject the potential advantages of international 
trade, but rebuffs the idea of automatic benefits from trade and reproaches laissez-faire (Heckscher, 
1955, part V). 
 
As Keynes’ revival in the General Theory shows, the ghost of mercantilism has not been laid to 
rest, despite Smith’s excommunication. The mercantilist ghost speaks to those who do not believe 
in ‘immanent social rationality’ but that ‘social causation [the existence of objective social laws] 
and state interference could go together’ (Heckscher 1955: 321-2). As often the case with influential 
ideas or authors, it is difficult to discern the original thought (assuming that something resembling 
organic mercantilist thought existed, which is likely) from how it has later been perceived. The 
mercantilist ghost reappeared with the pro-developmental theory of Friedrich List and the German 
Historical School, which greatly influenced East Asian economic development, and with a gloomier 
stance in periods of economic crisis when the terms neo or new mercantilism covered protectionist 
practices or threats, as in the 1930s and early 1970s. International Political Economy has also been 
much influenced by mercantilism (Gilpin 1987).  
 
3.2. Mercantilist economics and mercantilist economies 
Summarising the argument so far, as a theoretical source of inspiration, a mercantilist tradition can 
be identified in rejection of the existence of harmonic, beneficial and immanently rational natural 
laws (that acquire a theological flavour) in favour of a rational belief in the existence of natural laws 
that are not automatically harmonic, beneficial and immanently rational and that can be, must be 
and are actually managed by political intervention. In a broad sense, mercantilism is the opposite of 
laissez-faire.  As a practical behaviour, what has been defined as benign mercantilism has   7 20/05/2010 
represented the ideology and practice of national policies of industrialisation and welfare as parts of 
the process of building state and full sovereignty (Buzan 1984: 608). Benign mercantilism might 
include the Keynesian pursuit of international macroeconomic cooperation as a pre-requisite for 
trade liberalisation, and recourse to defensive protectionism to defend domestic employment and 
welfare in the absence of a cooperative stance, especially from big industrial powers. Malevolent or 
aggressive protectionism is defined as the pursuit of economic and political power through a trade 
surplus. Obsession with production and productivity and repression of wages and domestic 
consumption has been identified with this view (Furniss 1920). 
 
3.3. The origins of malevolent mercantilism 
Scholars of mercantilism have long debated the ultimate aims of the policies that go under this 
label, and in particular the aim of a trade surplus. Heckscher (1955: I-24) regarded the ‘state’s 
external power, in relation to other states’ as the ultimate purpose of mercantile policies. 
Notoriously, Jacob Viner (1948) retorted that ‘wealth’ – private as well as national - was at least as 
important as ‘power’ in the original mercantilist literature. Heckscher only superficially accepted 
the criticism, continuing to regard wealth as a basis for state power (ibid I-25). In this respect a 
trade surplus should be regarded as an instrument of relative power with respect to competing 
nations. Among others, Heckscher (II-22) quotes a German mercantilist who argued that: ‘Whether 
a nation be to-day mighty and rich or not depends not on the abundance or scarcity of its powers or 
riches, but principally on whether its neighbours possess more or less than it. For power and riches 
have become a relative matter, dependent on being weaker and poorer than others.’ According to 
Furniss (1920: 11-14) and Johnson (1937: 366) the mercantilist had the idea that a trade surplus 
amounts to a quantity of domestic labour paid by foreigners (the so-called ‘balance of labour’). Full 
employment as a basis of relative economic strength, accompanied by low wages was indeed a 
central objective for a typical mercantilist (Furniss 1920: 8, 40; Heckscher 1955: II-165). The 
capacity to create wealth was regarded as more important than wealth itself (ibid: II-124). Evocative 
as it may sound, the idea of relative national power obtained by a trade surplus contains some 
element of vagueness, at least to those who do not believe in a generic concept of overall national 
interest to be pursued against other countries. More substance should therefore be given to this 
concept by referring, for instance, to the specific concerns of the dominant elites. 
 
We also find the idea that net exports are the only source of economic surplus for a nation in 
mercantilist literature. A widely quoted author is Charles Davenant ‘It is the Interest of all Trading 
Nations, whatsoever, that their Home Consumption should be little, of a Cheap and Foreign Growth   8 20/05/2010 
and that their own manufacturers should be Sold at the highest Markets, and spent Abroad; Since by 
what is Consumed at Home, one loseth only what another gets, and the Nation in General is not at 
all the Richer; but all Foreign Consumption is a Clear and Certain Profit’ (1697, quoted by 
Heckscher: II-115). A Kaleckian flavour might be read in this passage, net exports as a source of 
profits, but the association should not be overrated. Kalecki’s concern with the external trade 
surplus was related to realisation of a domestic surplus, so that net exports were a determinant of 
profits (e.g. Kalecki 1971). Only a few mercantilists, however, clearly related the possibility of a 
trade surplus to the existence of a domestic surplus, namely a social product above what is 
necessary to reproduce the system on the same scale, let alone the absence of much concern with 
problems of aggregate demand in typical mercantilist literature. A mercantilist flavour can 
nonetheless be read in Kalecki: net export as way to get rid of domestic surplus and to make profits, 
and source of the credit capacity necessary to finance the trade deficit of dependent ‘external 
markets’.   
 
Although with less theoretical depth than Kalecki, Joan Robinson (1966: 10) also regarded ‘new 
mercantilist’ competition as a natural state in a world in which ‘the total market does not grow fast 
enough to make room for all’ so that ‘each government feels it a worthy and commendable aim to 
increase its own share in world activity for the benefit of its own people’. The drama is that some 
‘can win only if others lose’. Moreover, success breeds success: ‘The most important benefit from a 
surplus … is that … it permits home investment to go full steam ahead, while a deficit country is 
nervously pulling on the brake for fear of excessive imports. Investment in the strong country brings 
technical progress which improves its competitive position and makes its balance of trade all the 
stronger, while the weak country slips into stagnation or suffers distressing spasms of stop and go.’  
 
Of course the capitalist ruling class does not deliberately pursue a mercantilist strategy from reading 
Kalecki. It can, however, have in mind an economic self-sustaining model like this: a disciplined 
and well-trained labour force creates the basis of foreign trade leadership; wage moderation 
(relative to average productivity) assures capital profitability;
8 foreign markets offset repression of 
the domestic consumption market due to low wages, the external penetration of firms is encouraged 
while foreign investment in the home market is discouraged (Guerrieri and Padoan 1986: 30-3); 
successful exports and depressed imports (due to restrained domestic consumption) lead to a trade 
surplus that becomes the icon of the success of the model and the morning star of social and 
economic policy, in particular labour market discipline; a stable real exchange rate, preserved 
through a low domestic inflation rate (again a result of labour market discipline) preserves   9 20/05/2010 
competitiveness of exports on one hand and attainment of necessary imports of wage and 
production goods at stable costs; external success also drives home investment and productivity; in 
addition, the trade surplus allows the country to finance decentralisation of the less sophisticated 
parts of production in ancillary countries with lower labour costs, to finance the current account 
deficit of trade partners, and acquire foreign financial and real assets; the political power derived 
from this strong financial position consents the country to resist external pressure to change its 
policies and to create an international economic context favourable for their continuation (e.g. the 
EMS and the EMU in the case of Germany).  
 
In synthesis, external success brings domestic discipline and efficiency that in turn assure foreign 
competitiveness and profits (this is what the capitalist elite perceives and pursues); profits are 
realised through net exports (this is the Kaleckian hidden part). 
 
3.4. Mercantilism and the international context 
It has been argued that there is no discontinuity between the two kinds of mercantilism and that the 
more or less benign nature of mercantilist policies depends on the international context rather than 
on states’ subjective aims (Guerrieri and Padoan 1986). The international context may doubtless 
accommodate different degrees of mercantilism. Typically, the political and economic interests of 
the hegemonic power (in the sense of Kindleberger 1981) may tolerate doses of mercantilist policies 
by weaker allies, as the US did with Western Europe and Japan in the Bretton Woods era, or later 
with regard to East Asian countries including China (Medeiros 1997), in what has been named the 
Bretton Woods II system (Dooley et al. 2003). As observed by Guerrieri and Padoan (1986: 33): 
‘Successful pursuit of a neomercantilist policy rests on the ex ante structure of international 
relations and in particular on some countries’ acceptance of the fact that others pursue such a 
policy. In the hegemonic system, one country (the United States) must agree to act as a “residual 
economy”.’ The very success of export-led growth may, however, ultimately shake the economic 
fundamentals of international equilibria, and mercantilist policies may become less tolerable and a 
source of international instability.  
 
What is weird in the case of Germany is that this country seems to have become progressively more 
mercantilist in the 1970s, precisely when the international context required her to share economic 
leadership and coordination with the enervated hegemonic power. The designation of malevolent or 
aggressive mercantilism therefore appears to suit Germany: pursuit of a trade surplus and a repeated 
lack of international cooperation.    10 20/05/2010 
 
4. GERMANY AS A MERCANTILE ECONOMY 
Since unification, Germany has been an example of benign mercantilist in the sense of state 
building, industrializing and creating welfare institutions to sustain social cohesion. As in Japan, the 
people are trained in discipline and community concern and this is a decisive asset for Germany, 
though it should not be forgotten that she suffered traumatic social and ideological conflicts last 
century. German national assets remerged in a more peaceful context in the post WW II 
reconstruction period, followed by the German economic miracle. As argued at the end of section 
3.3, the external whip may be regarded as functional for internal discipline and efficiency. An 
export-oriented economy was a deliberate decision of the German elite after WW II. In 1953, for 
instance, Ludwig Erhard stated that ‘foreign trade is not a specialized activity for a few who might 
engage in it, but the very core and even precondition of our economic and social order.’ In this 
regard, it is worth mentioning the traditional German concept of Ordnung:  
 
which can be directly translated to mean order but which really means an economy, society, 
and polity that are structured but not dictatorial. The founders of the social market economy 
insisted that Denken in Ordnungen - to think in terms of systems of order- was essential. 
They also spoke of Ordo-Liberalismus because the essence of the concept is that this must 
be a freely chosen order, not a command order.
9 
 
It is generally maintained that although already an export-led country, after the first oil shock 
Germany became a malevolent mercantilist country (e.g. Ciocca and Vito Colonna 1981: 109).
10 
The reaction of Germany to the economic turmoil of the 1970s featured many of the traditional 
components of malevolent mercantilism: wage moderation, fiscal restraint, a resulting favourable 
inflation rate differential, such as to compensate any appreciation of the nominal exchange rate and 
preserve competitiveness, as well as little concern for international reflationary action. Izzo and 
Spaventa (1981: 77) criticise the argument that Germany’s specialisation in export goods, typically 
machinery, would make support of domestic demand ineffective in stimulating domestic output. 
Even admitting the validity of the premise, the two authors object that this support would in any 
case stimulate imports, and thus recovery of partner countries, and therefore lead to larger German 
exports. Kindleberger (1976: 126-7) listed a number of structural reasons for the German trade 
surplus that included moderate inflation, industrial competitiveness and high propensity to save, so 
that disequilibrium was ‘in the nature of things’, although he no longer rejected, as he did in an 
early paper, a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy, for instance, by revaluations of the nominal exchange   11 20/05/2010 
rate insufficient to compensate the inflation differential between Germany and her competitors 
(ibid: 130). According to Ciocca and Vito Colonna (1981: 133) and Riccardo Parboni (1980: 105) 
German mercantilism or German imperialism had the aim, through direct investment and foreign 
credit, both permitted by the trade surplus, of creating a wide German-dominated area that would 
included south and eastern Europe. This behaviour aggravated the international deflationary cycle 
(e.g. Valli 1981: 10; Ciocca and Vito Colonna 1981: 135) and low European growth (Guerrieri and 
Padoan 1986: 40).  
 
In 1975-1978 the OECD sponsored the so-called ‘locomotive theory’ of coordinated international 
recovery led by the main countries. The international pressure on Germany was eventually 
successful, so that in 1978 this country approved a successful fiscal stimulus that also led to a 
current balance deficit (Ciocca and Vito Colonna 1981: 117). However in 1979, as a consequence 
of the second oil shock, the German policy stance was soon reversed and the expansion judged 
ephemeral, a ‘straw fire’ according to Otmar Issing, ‘an experience never to be repeated’ (Bibow 
2009b:15).
11 A widely held fear of inflation is the standard justification for German caution. Bibow 
(ibid.:13, cf. also Dal Bosco 1987: 88-89) regards this interpretation, however, as a social image 
aptly fabricated, not least by the Bundesbank: it was high unemployment that opened the way to 
Nazism, not hyper-inflation, as ordinary people in Germany and abroad are led to believe (hyper-
inflation took place much earlier, in 1918-1924).  
Since Germany refused to cooperate in an international effort to reflate, competitive devaluation by 
the European partners could be expected. Creation of the EMS (and later the EMU) could thus be 
interpreted as preventive moves by Germany to impede this retaliation (Ciocca and Vito Colonna 
1981: 127). It is noteworthy that on one hand, these partners willingly condescended to the 
competitive deflation framework imposed by Germany in order to destroy trade union power 
(Parboni 1985: 233), possibly hoping, on the other hand, that the prospect of a monetary union 
would enhance their say. They only succeeded in the first aim. The EMS and later the EMU were 
tailored to the German model, though not without incongruities. Let us reconsider the three pillars 
of European economic policy sketched in section 1. 
 
The ECB is often seen as heir to the Bundesbank in the role of watchdog of the German labour 
market, while the strong Euro is heir to strong DM policy. As already mentioned, Germany had her 
cake and ate it too with the EMS and later the EMU, refusing to sustain domestic demand and 
hindering her European partners from devaluing their currencies in retaliation. On the other hand, 
Euroland internal imbalances have increased since the EMU. Wage stagnation and productivity   12 20/05/2010 
growth permitted Germany to gain in competitiveness with respect to her European competitors, 
while an interest rate policy tailored to German necessities has also contributed to the emergence of 
European imbalances in a non coordinated EMU context. Namely, low interest rates suited to the 
deflationary German context have induced housing-bubble-led growth elsewhere in Europe. 
Tellingly enough, the German export economy has benefitted hugely from these bubbles, perhaps 
unexpectedly. With little regard to signs that the bubbles were about to burst, in early summer 2008 
the ECB raised the interest rate to intimidate German trade union wage claims. 
 
Similar incongruence can be seen with regard to European fiscal policy. As noted by Bibow (2009a 
p.5), Germany benefited from her partners’ profligacy, especially in the 1980s:  ‘The point is that 
the German model worked for Germany precisely because and as long as others behaved 
differently.’ However in the 1990s, once German rigour had been exported through the Maastricht 
regime, this backfired on Germany through lower demand. The German interest in fiscal severity 
may be justified by her concern about the strength of the Euro, as part of her strategy of containing 
the cost of imported inputs. Finally, the European employment strategy based on national labour 
market flexibility has been called ‘competitive deflation’: it is clearly a zero-sum strategy, or 
perhaps a Pyrrhic victory for Germany. 
 
Summing up, the German export economy model is a well-ordered model which by definition 
imposes social responsibility and discipline on German society, especially Trade Unions, since its 
very continuation depends on foreign competitiveness that depends on productivity growth and 
wage moderation.
12 Exports, being concentrated on capital goods, do non require an internal 
consumption market. The foreign exchange policy preserves a constant real exchange rate, so that 
on the export side firms must rely on technical change to gain competitiveness, and on the import 
side the cost of imported wage and production goods is contained. Monetary institutions, first the 
Bundesbank and later the ECB, are watchdogs of wage responsibility, the so-called natural 
unemployment rate being defined in order to obtain labour discipline. The trade surplus serves the 
dual purpose of creating a regional German economic area in which to decentralise production and 
acquire activities, and of financing foreign demand for German goods, at least until debtor 
countries’ own imbalances become unbearable. The threat of off shoring production has been used 
to bully the German labour force, even by big companies, as in the Siemens case in 2004. Economic 
and political power are associated with the German trade surplus, allowing her to have the final 
word in European institutions and to resist pressures from other global giants that could upset an 
international context functional to her mercantilist stance. This power has been evident in the   13 20/05/2010 
definition of European economic policies and in German behaviour in the current and past crises. 
This model is not, however, without contradictions at global and European level. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
German mercantilism has been indicated as a co-factor in triggering and perpetuating the current 
crisis.  This paper found that a rationale of the German model was presumably maintenance of an 
efficient, disciplined and profitable national economy associated with international economic and 
political power.  A French commentator, aptly reported by Dal Bosco (1987: 10, my translation), 
provides a historical perspective for this interpretation: 
 
The economic policy choices of Federal Germany in the post-war period – parity choice and 
price stability – reiterated and widened the outward orientation of the German economy, a 
historical legacy of the German Reich (…). The external successes of the Federal Republic 
of Germany had a positive effect on domestic social and economic relations, recalling the 
interpretation advanced by historians of Imperial Germany, that domestic order was a 
necessary condition for external projects that in turn reinforced internal order. 
 
Yet as we noted above, all participants of the EMS and EMU were willing to create some order in 
their own labour market relations (this was clear in the case of Italian participation in the EMS in 
1979). This suggests that in capitalism, malevolent mercantilist behaviour is generally not specific 
to some bad guy, but is more of a natural course for the ruling class, as envisaged by Kalecki and 
Joan Robinson (and Rosa Luxemburg), since it couples labour market discipline and foreign market 
realisation of the surplus. Moreover, in an international market where the harmony of relative 
advantages is theoretically and practically flawed, countries strive to get as many absolute 
advantages as they can. So they would all actually like to be Germany, the ‘successful’ mercantilist 
country; unfortunately, this is not possible by definition. As Joan Robinson pointed out: ‘All 
industrial countries want a surplus on income account. “Export-led growth” is the most convenient 
way of running modern capitalism. Whoever succeeds at any moment is accidental, largely 
depending on historical circumstances and political and psychological influences. Success leads to 
success and failure engenders failure’ (quoted by Burbidge 1978: 42).  In addition, obtainment of 
persistent trade surpluses by the successful mercantilist giant contributes to the creation of regional 
and global imbalances that may periodically boomerang on the temporary winner (Bibow 2006: 26). 
Unfortunately, the opposite policy framework, international Keynesism, has been more of an   14 20/05/2010 
accident of history associated with the Cold War, than a rule. It is capitalism that is malevolent, not 
a single country. 
 
One hope for Europe is that the contrast between the humiliating role played by the EU at the 
Copenhagen meeting on global warming and the European economic imbalances revealed by the 
Greek crisis, on one hand, and Chinese political and economic ambitions on the other, will induce at 
least a moderate change in European political stance with Germany accepting some degree of 
economic policy co-ordination and some form of federal fiscal policy at continental level. The most 
recent developments (May 2010), however, suggest that the German interpretation of fiscal 
coordination consists just of a more restrictive European policy stance without assailing the 
fundamental causes of the regional imbalances. The European perspectives appear therefore rather 
bleak (see Cesaratto 2010). 
 
Notes and references 
1 Forthcoming with minor differences in Brancaccio E., Fontana G. (2011). I thank, without 
implications, Franklin Serrano, Sergio Parrinello and Massimo Pivetti for valuable suggestions. 
2  For a critical comparison of the two views see Palley (2009). 
3 See for example Paul Krugman in the New York Times, Wolfgang Munchau in the Financial 
Times, Marcello De Cecco in La Repubblica. 
4 Exchange rate policy is discussed by the Eurogroup. 
5 Pundits hinted at the German model as the long-run cause of European troubles (Martin Woolf, 
Financial Times, 9 February 2010). The present Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish troubles - as well 
as those of the Baltic and eastern European nations - suggest the fragile nature of the catching-up 
process of these countries in the EMU era, disproving the optimistic view of Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2002). The EMU certainly facilitated sustaining of persistent current account deficits of 
these countries by financing the housing-bubbles and/or deficit spending growth at the origin of 
those deficits. According to the conventional economists cited, this is a natural process, whereby 
rich countries, in which capital is abundant, finance fellow countries that are catching up. However, 
this course of events seems much more similar to the Kaleckian view of developed countries 
financing their external markets by lending money to developing countries (Kalecki 1971).  The 
same developed countries cannot avoid rescuing indebted countries from time to time, as Germany 
will possibly do in the present case.  
6 As pointed out by Parrinello (2009a, 2009b), the standard presentation of Ricardian theory hastily 
assumes an exogenously given amount of fully employed labour in the two trading countries,   15 20/05/2010 
whereas Ricardo conceived the labour supply as an endogenous variable that adapts itself to the 
vagaries of capital accumulation in the long run. Parrinello also shows that in a post-Keynesian 
model in which effective demand determines unemployment equilibria, absolute advantages may 
prevail over comparative advantages. 
7 A number of studies by Sraffian authors have used the results of the capital theory controversy to 
demolish neoclassical harmonic theorems of international trade (cf. Parrinello 2009a). 
8 Note that although wage moderation is a component of mercantilism, real wages would generally 
rise faster in the successful mercantilist economy, as Joan Robinson (1966: 17) remarked: 
‘Industrial countries have been experiencing a continuous process of rising money-wage rate. In the 
stagnant country, costs are pushed-up, making its competitive position all the weaker, while the 
strong country can afford a greater rise, because output per head is increasing faster and yet subject 
to less pressure, because its workers’ real earnings are visibly growing.’ 
9 From the US Library of Congress Country Studies. 
10 A standard neoclassical explanation justifies German surplus in view of the ageing process: 
mature German generations save a lot and accumulate foreign assets now, in order to be able to 
finance their retirement. From a practical point of view, this does not explain why the trade surplus 
policy began in the seventies, or earlier. The analytical problems of the conventional view of 
pensions in open economies are shown by Cesaratto 2005: 212-20. 
11 When Germany abandoned the idea of coordinated fiscal recovery, this led to failure of 
Mitterrand’s famous adoption of Keynesian policies in 1981. This was a genuine straw fire. 
12 ‘La croissance économique de la RFA, orientée vers l’exportation, a été entretenue par une 
véritable ‘mistique’ qu’aucun groupe social n’a réellement remise en question’ (Le Gloannec 1980: 
291). In February 2010, no concern about weak domestic consumption prevented Ig-Metall from 
giving up any real wage claim in the bargaining season in order to preserve employment levels and 
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